For a handy guide on x86 and GDB, check out this GDB Cheatsheet.

Question 1  Stack Diagram Practice

Consider the following function.

```c
void swap(int* num1, int* num2, int arr_local[]) {
    int temp = *num1;
    *num1 = *num2;
    arr_local[0] = *num1;
    *num2 = temp;
    arr_local[1] = *num2;
}

int main(void) {
    int x = 61;
    int y = 1;
    int arr[2];
    swap(&x, &y, arr);
}
```

1. Complete the diagram of the stack if the code were executed until a breakpoint set on line 3. Assume normal (non-malicious) program execution. You do not need to write the values on the stack, only the names. There are no extraneous boxes, and each box represents 4 bytes in memory. The bottom of the page represents the lower addresses.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>main's sfp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int* arr_local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int* num2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>int* num1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swap's rip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>swap's sfp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

2. Now, draw arrows on the stack diagram denoting where the ESP and EBP would point if the code were executed until a breakpoint set on line 3.
Question 2  Software Vulnerabilities

For the following code, assume an attacker can control the value of `basket`, `n`, and `owner_name` passed into `search_basket`.

This code contains several security vulnerabilities. **Circle three such vulnerabilities** in the code and briefly explain each of the three on the next page.

```c
struct cat {
    char name[64];
    char owner[64];
    int age;
};

/* Searches through a BASKET of cats of length N (N should be less than 32). Adopts all cats with age less than 12 (kittens). Adopted kittens have their owner name overwritten with OWNER_NAME. Returns the number of kittens adopted. */
size_t search_basket(struct cat *basket, int n, char *owner_name) {
    struct cat kittens[32];
    size_t num_kittens = 0;
    if (n > 32) return -1;
    for (size_t i = 0; i <= n; i++) {
        if (basket[i].age < 12) {
            /* Reassign the owner name. */
            strcpy(basket[i].owner, owner_name);
            /* Copy the kitten from the basket. */
            kittens[num_kittens] = basket[i];
            num_kittens++;
            /* Print helpful message. */
            printf("Adopting kitten: ");
            printf(basket[i].name);
            printf("\n");
        }
    }
    /* Adopt kittens. */
    adopt_kittens(kittens, num_kittens); // Implementation not shown
    return num_kittens;
}
```
1. Explanation:

**Solution:** Line 12 has a fencepost error: the conditional test should be \( i < n \) rather than \( i \leq n \). The test at line 11 assures that \( n \) doesn’t exceed 32, but if it’s equal to 32, and if all of the cats in `basket` are kittens, then the assignment at line 17 will write past the end of `kittens`, representing a buffer overflow vulnerability.

2. Explanation:

**Solution:** At line 12, we are checking if \( i \leq n \). \( i \) is an unsigned int and \( n \) is a signed int, so during the comparison \( n \) is cast to an unsigned int. We can pass in a value such as \( n = -1 \) and this would be cast to `0xffffffff` which allows the for loop to keep going and write past the buffer.

3. Explanation:

**Solution:** On line 15 there is a call to `strcpy` which writes the contents of `owner_name`, which is controlled by the attacker, into the owner instance variable of the cat struct. There are no checks that the length of the destination buffer is greater than or equal to the source buffer `owner_name` and therefore the buffer can be overflown.

**Solution:** Another possible solution is that on line 21 there is a `printf` call which prints the value stored in the name instance variable of the cat struct. This input is controlled by the attacker and is therefore subject to format string vulnerabilities since the attacker could assign the cats names with string formats in them.

Some more minor issues concern the `name` strings in `basket` possibly not being correctly terminated with `\0` characters, which could lead to reading of memory outside of `basket` at line 21.

Describe how an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain a shell:

**Solution:** Each vulnerability could lead to code execution. An attacker could also use the fencepost or the bound-checking error to overwrite the RIP and execute arbitrary code.
Question 3  Remus

This problem is Question 1 of Project 1 converted to a discussion question, with the intention of providing a foundation for completing Project 1. The question will also consist of a live GDB walkthrough, conducted by your TA. A video version of this walkthrough is available on https://cs161.org/.

Consider the following vulnerable code.

```c
#include <stdio.h>

void orbit()
{
  char buf[8];
  gets(buf);
}

int main()
{
  orbit();
  return 0;
}
```

1. Which line of code contains the memory safety vulnerability? Briefly explain this vulnerability.

Solution: Line 6 contains buffer overflow vulnerability with `gets()`. There are no checks that the stdin input to `gets()` is less than or equal to the length of `buf`, or 8 bytes. Thus, an attacker can use `gets()` to perform a buffer overflow attack, overwriting the RIP to point to an attacker’s shellcode.

2. Complete the stack diagram if the code were executed until a breakpoint set on line 6. Assume normal (non-malicious) program execution. You do not need to write the values on the stack, only the names. There are no extraneous boxes, and each box represents 4 bytes in memory. The bottom of the page represents the lower addresses.

3. Construct an input to `buf` that would result in a successful buffer overflow attack. Assume that `orbit`’s RIP is stored at 0xfffff8e0 and that you have a SHELLCODE script that you would like to execute. In addition, assume that there are 8 bytes of compiler padding.
Solution: 'A' * 20 + '\xe4\xf8\xff\xff' + SHELLCODE

With this input, we overwrite orbit’s RIP to point to the SHELLCODE stored above the RIP.