# **Cryptocurrencies** CS 161 Spring 2022 Lecture 12



D J Capelis @djcapelis · Feb 19 Algorithms: I want to solve a problem Data science: I want to understand a problem Al: I want to solve a problem and not understand the solution Blockchain: I want to be a problem



## Why Talk About Cryptocurrencies?!?

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### I am an actual expert in this area

- It has been one of my research focuses for the past 9+ years!
- Mining the space for academic papers and comedy godl since 2013
- But I want it to die in a fire!
  - There is effectively no value:
    - Private Blockchains are 20+ year old ideas
    - Public Blockchains are grossly inefficient in the name of "decentralization" without actually being decentralized!
      - And don't actually solve any problems other than those required to implement cryptocurrencies!
    - Cryptocurrencies don't work as currency unless you are a criminal!
- Yet it has refused to just go away
- And it touches on a lot of real world "security" issues that often have nothing to do with actual security!

### This Lecture and Blue Slides...

- This lecture really is *mostly* a set of blue slides!
  - It really can't be tested on...
- Instead, think of this as an intellectual vaccination
  - Once you realize just how bleeding stupid that space is you will be immune from wasting your time on it
- Plus there are some concepts of relevance otherwise:
  - Hash chains, Merkle Trees, Sybils



## Linked Lists Blockchains And CryptoCurrencies

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### "Blockchain Technology"


- A fancy word for "Append-Only Data Structure"
  - That causes people's eyes to glaze over and them to throw money at people
- "Private/Permissioned Blockchain":
  - A setup where only one or a limited number of systems are authorized to append to the log
  - AKA 20 year old, well known techniques
- "Public/Permissionless Blockchain":
  - Anybody can participate as appenders so there is supposedly no central authority: Difficulty comes in removing "sibyls"

### Cryptocurrencies

Things that don't actually work as currencies...

### Hash Chains

- If a data structure includes a hash of the previous block of data: This forms a "hash chain"
- So if you have a way of validating the ending block: The inclusion of the previous block's hash validates all the previous blocks
- This also makes it easy to add blocks to data structures
  - Only need to hash block + hash of previous block, rather than rehash everything: How you can efficiently hash an "append only" datastructure
- Now just validate the head (e.g. with signatures) and voila!
  - All a "blockchain" is is a renamed hashchain! Linked timestamping services used this structure and were proposed back in 1990!
  - Certificate Revocation Lists are signed hash-chains



### Merkle Trees

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- Lets say you have a lot of elements
  - And you want to add or modify elements
- And you want to make the hash of the set easy to update
- Enter hash trees/merkle trees
  - Elements 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5...
  - H(0), H(1), H(2)...
  - H(H(0) + H(1)), H(H(2)+H(3))...
  - The final hash is the root of the top of the tree.
- And so on until you get to the root
  - Allows you to add an element and update lg(n) hashes Rather than having to rehash all the data
  - Patented in 1979!!




Image Stolen from Wikipedia

## A Trivial Private Blockchain...

- We have a single server s, with keys  $K_{pub}$  and  $K_{priv}$ ...
  - And a git archive **g**... (in which we fix git to use SHA-256)
- Whenever we issue a pull request...
  - The server validates that the pull request meets the allowed criteria
  - Accepts the pull request
  - Signs the hash of the head...
- And that is it!
  - Git is an append only data structure, and by signing the new head, we have the server authenticating the *entire archive!*
- This is why "private" blockchain is *not* a revolution!!!
  - Anything that would benefit from an append-only, limited writer database already has one!


## What Is A "Cryptocurrency"?

- A cryptocurrency is a tradable cryptographic token
  - The goal is to create irreversible electronic cash with no centralized trust: If Alice wants to pay Bob 200 Quatloos to pay off her losing bet on the Green thrall, there should be *nobody else who can block or reverse this transfer*
- Based on the notion of a public ledger (the "Blockchain")
  - A public shared document that says "Alice has 3021.1141 Quatloos, Bob has 21.13710 Quatloos, Carol has 1028.8120 Quatloos..."
  - People can only add items to the ledger ("append-only"), never remove items
- Big Idea: Alice writes and signs a check to Bob saying
  - "I, Alice, Pay Bob 200 Quatloos"
    - This check then gets added to the public ledger so now everyone knows Alice now has 2821.1141 Quatloos and Bob has 221.13710 Quatloos





### What Is A "Cryptocurrency"?






## What Is A "Blockchain" (well, "Public" or "Permissionless" Blockchains)

- Everyone involved gathers up copies of the loose checks
  - For each check, validate that there are sufficient funds
  - Bundle all the checks up into a "block" and staple them together, with a pointer to the previous pile
- Everybody now does a lot of useless "work" that may eventually get lucky
  - The one that gets lucky staples this (which is in the form of a check saying "The system pays to ME the reward for success, the hash of the total stack is X") to the block as well, publishes this, and gets the reward
- Now everybody else knows this stapled pile of checks is now verified
  - So everybody starts on a new block, pointing to the previous block and gathers up the new checks that haven't yet been processed
- Result is an *append only* data structure
  - Rewriting history to change/remove a transaction requires as much effort as spent to create history



## What Is A "Blockchain" (well, "Public" or "Permissionless" Blockchains)



## What Is Bitcoin?



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- Simply the first widespread development of this idea
  - A "Bitcoin wallet" is simply a collection of cryptographic keys
    - Private key *K*<sub>priv</sub>: A secret value stored in the wallet
    - Public key  $K_{pub}$ : A public value that anybody is allowed to see, derived from the private key
  - The "Bitcoin Blockchain" is Bitcoin's particular implementation of the shared ledger
- Spending Bitcoin is simply writing a check and broadcasting it:
  - "Pay *K<sub>pub</sub>*=1Ross5Np5doy4ajF9iGXzgKaC2Q3Pwwxv the value 0.05212115 Bitcoin...

And whoever validates this transaction gets 0.0005 Bitcoin"

- Signed 1FuckBTCqwBQexxs9jiuWTiZeoKfSo9Vyi:
  - This is Bitcoin transaction d6b24ab29fa8e8f2c43bb07a3437538507776a671d9301368b1a7a32107b7139



### What Is Bitcoin?



0.05212115 BTC

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#### d6b24ab29fa8e8f2c43bb07a3437538507776a671d9301368b1a7a32107b7139

1FuckBTCqwBQexxs9jiuWTiZeoKfSo9Vyi (0.05 BTC - Output) 1FuckBTCqwBQexxs9jiuWTiZeoKfSo9Vyi (0.000016 BTC - Output) 1FuckBTCqwBQexxs9jiuWTiZeoKfSo9Vyi (0.00235018 BTC - Output) 1FuckBTCqwBQexxs9jiuWTiZeoKfSo9Vyi (0.00025497 BTC - Output)

Summary	
Size	763 (bytes)
Weight	3052
Received Time	2015-02-04 21:15:16
Included In Blocks	341974 ( 2015-02-04 21:16:58 + 2 minutes )
Confirmations	180240 Confirmations
Visualize	View Tree Chart

	0.05212115 BTC
Inputs and Outputs	
Total Input	0.05262115 BTC
Total Output	0.05212115 BTC
Fees	0.0005 BTC
Fee per byte	65.531 sat/B
Fee per weight unit	16.383 sat/WU
Estimated BTC Transacted	0.05212115 BTC
Scripts	Hide scripts & coinbase

1Ross5Np5doy4... (Free Ross Ulbricht @) - (Spent)

## What Is Bitcoin Mining?



- It is the particular instance used to protect the transaction history for Bitcoin
  - Based on SHA-256
- Every miner takes all the unconfirmed transactions and puts them into a block
  - The block has fixed capacity (currently 1MB), limiting the global rate to ~3-7 transactions per second, and also includes a timestamp
  - Also attaches the "pay me the block reward and all fees" check to the front (the "coinbase")
  - Also attaches the hash of the previous block (including by reference everything in the past)
- Then performs the "Proof of work" calculation
  - Just hashes the block, changing it trivially until the hash starts with enough 0s.
    - This is the "difficulty factor", which automatically adjusts to ensure that, worldwide, a new block is discovered roughly every 10 minutes
- On success it broadcasts the new block

### So Proof of Work...

- Remember, SHA256 looks random...
  - So just tweak one bit and the output looks totally different
- So if I present to you a string and the corresponding hash that starts with *n* 0-bits...
  - I probably had to do **2**<sup>n</sup> hashes
- So you can trivially verify that I did a ton of useless work with just a single hash
  - So to rewrite the last k blocks of history you have to do as many hashes as were used to record the last k blocks in the first place



### The Blockchain Size Problem

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- In order to verify that Alice has a balance...
  - You have to potentially check every transaction back to the beginning of the chain
- Results in amazingly inefficient storage
  - Every full Bitcoin node needs access to the *entire* transaction history
    - Because the entire history is needed to validate the transaction
  - A "lightweight" node still needs to keep the headers for all history
    - And still has to ask for suitable information to verify each transaction it needs to verify
- So if we have 10,000 nodes, this means 10,000 copies of the Bitcoin Blockchain!



## Corollary: The Blockchain Capacity Problem...

- To limit the blockchain growth to "just" 1 MB a block...
  - An early defense against possible spam
  - The resulting design for Bitcoin can only process 3-7 transactions per second *worldwide!*
- Which means any "Bitcoin takes over money" requires trusted, centralized entities that maintain databases...
  - Oh, yeah, those are called banks! We have "electronic money" as a result, and have had it for decades!
- Also results in price shocks
  - When desired transactions < block capacity, transactions are cheap
  - When desired transactions > block capacity, prices spiral up because of an inelastic supply
  - Unknown attacks have cause transaction price shocks for the lulz!

### The Blockchain Power Problem

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- The Bitcoin system consumes roughly 23 GW of power right now (or basically Thailand!)
- This is because Proof of Work creates a Red Queen's Race
  - As long as there is potential profit to be had you get an increase in capability
  - Efficiency gains get translated into more effort, not less power consumption:
     10x the hashes doesn't mean 10x the bitcoin but just 10x the difficulty factor
- There is *no way* to reduce Bitcoin's power consumption without reducing Bitcoin's price or the block reward
  - It is this waste of energy that protects Bitcoin!



### The Bitcoin Folks *lie* about the power consumption...

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### Claim this rescues "stranded power"

- But this is the point of a power *grid*: We ship electricity half-way across the country (Well, not to Texas because they have a separate grid so they can ignore federal regulations)
- Claim this incentivizes "green power"
  - But bitcoin mining wants 24/7/365 power ("base load")
     Base load power is only hydroelectric, fossil-fuel, or nuclear
  - And there really are no new spots for dams
- Oh, but other things burn power too...
  - Yeah, ALL data centers together is probably 2x-3x Bitcoin... But Bitcoin can only do 3-7 transactions per second on a WORLDWIDE BASIS!
  - And unlike Bitcoin, data centers try to reduce the power consumption
- Tesla's \$1.5B is really a \$1.5B in "Destroy the Planet Inc" Annual Bitcoin CO<sub>2</sub> emission of ~90 Mt of CO2 is equivalent to driving an F150 Raptor for >120 billion miles!



## The Sybil Problem...

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
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### There is a lot of talk about "consensus" algorithms in cryptocurrencies

- How the system agrees on a common view of history
- Bitcoin's is simple: "Longest Chain Wins"

### • But Proof of Work is *not* about consensus:

- It is about solving the sybil (fake node) problem...
   How do you prevent someone from just spinning up a gazillion "nodes"
  - Have each node have to contribute some resource!
- "Proof of stake" is just another solution...
   Which requires your money to be easy to steal!
   Plus enshrines "he who has the gold, rules!"
- But there is an easier one: "Articulated Trust!"
  - Like the CAs: Use human-based agreements to agree on **M** trusted parties
    - Only ½*M*+1 need to actually be trustworthy!
  - Why aren't there cryptocurrencies like this?
    - Well, there are a lot that use this under the hood but don't talk about it...
    - But if you do this you have legal obligations as a money transmitter!



## The Irreversibility Problem

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- A challenge: Buy \$1500 worth of Bitcoin *now*, without:
  - Needing \$1500 cash in hand, transferring money to an individual, or having a preexisting relationship with an exchange
- You *can't*!:

Everything electronic in modern banking is by design reversible except for cryptocurrencies

- This is designed for fraud mitigation: Ooops, something bad, undo undo...
- So the seller of a Bitcoin either must...
  - Take another irreversible payment ("Cash Only")
  - Have an established relationship so they can safely extend the buyer credit
  - Take a deposit from the buyer and wait a couple days



## The Theft Problem...

- Irreversibility also makes things very easy to steal
  - Compromise the private key & that is all it takes!
  - See "How to make money with Bitcoin in 10 easy steps" by your's truly
- Result: You can't store cryptocurrency on an Internet Connected Computer!
  - The best host-based IDS is an unsecured Bitcoin wallet
  - So instead you have hardware devices, paper wallets, and other schemes intended to safeguard cryptocurrency
    - It is worse than money under the mattress:
       Stealing money under the mattress requires *physical access!*
- But at the same time, *Not your keys, not your bitcoin!*
- Unlike a bank there is no deposit insurance should the exchange get robbed
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## And Even More Security Landmines...

- The primary tool these-days for self-hosted wallets is browser extensions like Metamask
  - Used to interact with NFT marketplaces and other related issues
- But horribly opaque to use!
  - Phishing email just the other day used to sign blank-checks for NFT sales
  - Experts actually can't use it right!
- And just mention that word on Twitter...
  - And you will have plenty of "helpful" support bots trying to get your cryptocurrency!



### The Decentralization Dream...

- "Trust Nobody"
  - The entire *system* is trustworthy but each actor is not
- Requires that there never be a small group that can change things...
- It is basically an article of faith that this is a good & necessary idea
  - But about the only thing it really buys is censorship-resistance



### The Decentralization Reality


- Code is inevitably developed by only one or a few groups
  - And they can *and do* change it capriciously if it affects their money: When the Ethereum "DAO" theft occurred, the developers changed things to take *their* money back from the thief
- Rewarded mining centralizes
  - Especially with ASICs and "Stealth ASICs" for proof of work mining
  - And the miners can and do cheat, such as enable "double spending" attacks against gambling sites, or front-running in Ethereum
- Several just aren't decentralized at all
  - Trusted coordinator or seed nodes
  - Ability to override/freeze assets

## The True Value of Cryptocurrencies: Censorship Resistance...

- There is (purportedly) no central authority to say "thou shalt not" or "thou shouldn't have"
  - Well, they exist but they don't care about your drug deals...
- If you believe there should be no central authorities...
  - Cryptocurrencies are the only solution for electronic payments
- But know this enables
  - Drug dealing, money laundering, crim2crim payments, gambling, attempts to hire hitmen etc...
  - Ease of theft of the cryptocurrencies themselves
  - Ransomware and extortion: estimates of several billion dollars a year!
- And some minor "good" uses
  - Payments to Wikileaks and Backpage when they were under financial restrictions

## Cryptocurrencies don't work unless you *need* censorship resistance

- Any volatile cryptocurrency transaction for real-world payments requires two currency conversion steps
  - It is the only way to remove the volatility risk
    - Which is why companies selling stuff aren't actually using Bitcoin, but a service that turns BTC into Actual Money<sup>™</sup>
    - And thanks to the irreversibility problem, buying is expensive
  - But if you believe in the cryptocurrency, you *must hod!*!
- Result is that the promised financial applications (cheap remittances etc) can *never apply* in volatile currencies like Bitcoin
  - Really Bitcoin et al are *only* appropriate for buying drugs, paying ransoms, hiring fake hitmen, money laundering...
  - Otherwise, use PayPal, Venmo, Zelle, MPasa, Square, etc etc ...





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Worse:

## **Censorship Resistance Enables Crime**

- Before the cybercrooks had Liberty Reserve and still have WebMoney Webmoney...
  - But Liberty Reserve got shut down by the feds (a shutdown that *really*) screwed up the black market hackers), and WebMoney is Russia-only
- So the only censorship alternative is cash
  - Which requires mass ( $\$1M \approx 10$  kg) and physical proximity
- So the cryptocurrencies are the only game in town!
  - The drug dealers hated Bitcoin in 2013, and hate them all still, but it is the only thing that works
  - Ransomware used to be Green Dot & Bitcoin, but Green Dot was forced to clean up its act
  - Modern ransomware is a multi-billion-dollar industry enabled by Bitcoin • payments



Nicholas Weave



### And "Stablecoins" are no better...

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- · Removing the two currency conversion steps requires eliminating volatility
- Building a stable cryptocurrency requires an entity to convert dollars to tokens and vice versa *at par*.
  - AKA a "Bank" and "Banknotes"
    - Thus a centralized entity, so why bother with a "decentralized" blockchain?
    - All other "algorithmic stablecoins" are snake oil that implode spectacularly
- There is now a choice for the bank
  - Either you become as regulated as PayPal & Visa
  - Or you have a "wildcat bank": This is banking in the 1800s
  - Or you have "Liberty Reserve" and the principals end up in jail





# And The Big Stable-Coin, Tether, IS A FRAUD!!!

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- Bitcoin's value is purely a speculative bubble
  - Somebody in the future will pay more than you paid today
- Bitcoin has a price equation based on supply/demand
  - New Bitcoin = (New \$ + New Fake \$s)
- Bubbles have been drive by fake \$
  - 2013: Willy-Bot on MtGox: Created fake \$ in deposit in the Magic The Gathering Online Exchange Bitcoin exchange, bought Bitcoin
  - 2017: Tether:

A stablecoin which unbanked Bitcoin exchanges use since they can't access the banking system. Roughly 1/3rd of the price runup then

• 2020-22: Tether AGAIN:

The Tether Printer go BRRRRR. Now in a situation where real new \$ is deeply negative as they are adding billions of "dollars" a week in Tether (and now Circle) to buy Bitcoin to back the Tether...



## Practically Every Cryptocurrency is "Me Too" with some riff...

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- There are lots of cryptocurrencies.,
  - But in many ways they act the same: A public ledger structure and (perhaps) a purported decentralized nature
- Litecoin:
  - Bitcoin with a catchy slogan
- Dogecoin:
  - Bitcoin with a cool joke
- Ripple:
  - (Centralized) Bitcoin with unrelated settlement se

ripple







### IOTA:

(Centralized) Bitcoin but with trinary math
 \*\* and roll-thy-own cryptography ???!

### Monero:

Bitcoin with some better pseudonymity

### Zcash:

Bitcoin with *real* anonymity, err, "money laundering built in!"

### Ethereum:

• Bitcoin with "smart contracts", unlicensed securities and million dollar bug bounties



## Public Blockchain's Weak Security Guarantees


- "Public blockchains" protected by proof-of-whatever promise a "no central authorities" & "fully distributed trust" append-only data structure.
  - But this isn't the case!
- Any lottery-based reward creates mining pools
  - Which means a few entities *can and do* control things:
     5 entities effectively control Bitcoin with >50% of the hashrate
- The code developers also can and do act as central authorities
  - When ~10% of Ethereum was stolen from the "DAO", the developers rolled out a fork to undo the theft

### And worse...

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SlushPool



Hashrate Distribution

## Proof of Work's Economic Unsoundness

- Idea: The system wastes \$x per hour to defend against potential attackers
- If an attacker needs to change the last *n* hours of history...
  - They will need to spend at least \$nx, which acts as a floor
- This puts a ceiling on security as well: an attacker doesn't need to spend much more than \$*nx*
  - If an attacker can make more than \$*nx* for an attack, they will!
- And its grossly inefficient:
  - The system is wasting \$x per hour whether or not it is under attack
- Oh, and there are services!





## So The Security Must Be Either Weak or Inefficient

- Proof of work is provably wasteful
  - It *may* be possible to make "proof of stake" work, but that has different problems
- And there is no way to make proof of work cheap!
  - Proof of "whatever" protects up to the amount that "whatever" costs, but not more!
- So "articulated trust" is vastly cheaper
  - Take 10 trustworthy entities, each one has a Raspberry Pi that validates and signs transaction independently
    - In the end, 6 need to prove to be honest, but could easily process every Bitcoin transaction
  - This requires 100W of power and \$500 worth of computers!, or 9 orders of magnitude less power





### The Worm Problem....

- These cryptocurrencies form a closely connected peer-to-peer network
  - If you have an exploit that can compromise other nodes...
     You can make a self propagating attack (a "worm"), but do NOT DO SO
- Would be able to compromise *every node* in the P2P network in *seconds* 
  - And you know that thing about "don't keep your cryptocurrency on an internet connected system"? Yeah, how many actually do that!
- Target a secondary cryptocurrency...
  - EG, Dogecoin is a fork of Luckycoin is a fork of Litecoin is a fork of Bitcoin....
  - With half a decade of **NO UPDATES!**
  - So search the post-fork Bitcoin code for indications of memory vulnerabilities
  - And write a worm that steals all the OTHER cryptocurrencies!





## But wait, what about all the Venture Money!!!

### Old VC model

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- Invest in several companies
- One or two end up thriving
- Sell stock to the public in an IPO or sell to a larger company
- New A16Z: Securities Fraud as a Business
  - Invest in several "blockchain" startups
  - Startups issue new tokens promising something, eventually
    - These are unlicensed securities and this is blatantly illegal in the US, just not enforced by the SEC!
  - A16Z gets a ton of these tokens, sells to retail suckers
    - Ideally gets listed on Coinbase, but sketchier exchanges will do
  - If SEC ever wakes up...
    - It is the startups that committed the securities fraud, not A16Z! So they are safe with their money!

andreessen. horowi

# What About Non-Currency Blockchain Applications?

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- Put A Bird Blockchain On It!
- "Private" or "Permissioned" Blockchain
  - Simply a cryptographically signed hashchain: Techniques known for 20+ years!
  - The only value gained is you say "Blockchain" and idiots respond with "Take My Money!"
- "Public" Blockchains are grossly inefficient and can't actually deliver on what they promise
- And those proposing "blockchain" don't actually understand the problem space!
  - Solve (Voting, electronic medical records, food security, name your hard problem) by putting {what data exactly? How? What formats? What honesty? What enforcement?} in an append-only data structure


Nicholas Weaver

#### A Concrete Example...

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- A couple years ago there was a "Blockchain" class here at Berkeley
  - Yes, I screamed inside
  - I attended one session to give a short rebuttal...
    - But the two outside "experts" also present were delusional
- Concrete example: Vaccine supply chains...
  - You need to keep a vaccine supply chain suitably cold, if it gets too hot that is a problem...
  - One expert: "You can solve this in India with Blockchain!"
- BULLSHIT! You solve this with temperature-sensitive labels! At \$1.50 each
- Proof of Nick's Iron Law of Blockchain: Blockchain solves exactly one problem: When someone says "you can solve X with Blockchain", they clearly don't know anything about X and should be ignored



## But There Is One Innovative New Stupidity: "Smart Contracts"

- Idea! "Contracts are expensive!" 😌

  - So lets take standard things written in a formal language ("Legaleze")
  - And replace them with things written in a horrid language (that looks vaguely like JavaScript)
    - By default these "smart contracts" are fixed once released!
    - And this makes things cheaper **how**? •
- And ditch the exception handling mechanism
  - If you can steal from a Smart Contract, are you actually violating the contract?
- Backstory:

Idea created by Vittalik Butterin who was upset that World of Warcraft nerfed his spellcaster!



### "Smart Contract" Reality: Public Finance-Bots

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- They are really Public Finance-Bots
  - Small programs that perform money transfers
    - Finance bots are *not new*: The novelty is these finance bots are public and publicly accessible
    - Oh, and these aren't "distributed apps"



- Predictable Result: Million Dollar Bug Bounties!
  - The "DAO", a "voted distributed mutual fund as smart contract": Got ~10% of Ethereum before someone stole all the money!
  - The "Parity Multi-Signature Wallet" (an arrangement to add multiple-signature control to reduce theft probability)
  - The "Proof of Weak Hands 1.0" explicit Ponzi Scheme



#### And "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations"

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- Hey, lets get together and create an organization where we all invest and get a vote...
  - Yeah, this was invented centuries ago: It is called a "Joint Stock Corporation"
- But instead do it on a Blockchain...
  - So if something screws up, eh, ah well
- And not do the paperwork needed to actually be a corporation
  - Corporations have liability protections, investors aren't on the hook when a corporation commits crimes
- A better term is "Conspiracy"



## The Rest Is Speedrunning 500 years of bad economics...

- Almost every cryptocurrency exchange is full of frauds banned in the 1930s
- Ponzi schemes without postal reply coupons, including explicit ponzies as "Smart Contracts"
- Tether, a "stablecoin" is almost certainly a wildcat bank from the 1800s
- Every tradable ICO is really an unregulated security just like the plagues in the South Sea Bubble of 1720
- Replicated rare tulips with rare cats on the Ethereum Blockchain as a "Smart Contract"! Time to party like it is 1637!
- And don't forget the goldbug-ism...





## Smart Contracts and "Decentralized Finance": Speed Running the Speed Run

- "Hey, only Wall Street has previously benefitted from superwhiz-bangie techno innovations"
  - So lets instead build them as "Smart Contracts"?
- ONLY applications end up being:
  - Fraudulent stocks (ERC20 tokens)
  - Tulip Manias (Non-Fungible Tokens: A receipt for a URL saying 'I ownz this')
  - Implicit ponzi schemes ("Yield Farming")
  - Explicit ponzi schemes
  - Front-running bots and fraudulent miners
  - And million dollar thefts seemingly on a near-daily basis
    - Not sure which is more, the thefts or the frauds ("Rugpulls")?




#### And Now Rebranding: "Web 3"

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#### Hey, let's bring the UNSTOPPABLE **CENSORSHIP RESISTANT BLOCKCHAIN POWAH TO THE WEB**


- The current web: distributed
  - You need to contract with a DNS provider and a web hosting provider for a few bucks
    - If either dislike you they can censor you
    - But you can chose a friendly provider: Actual nazis can web host just fine, just not in Germany
- The computation in the current web:
  - A distributed computation split between the • server and the user's browser



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## The Web 3 Vision: ADD On Additional Crap...

- You still have the centralized hosting!!!
  - So no gatekeepers were removed
- You end up depending on additional *centralized* providers!
- But now some of the computation is paid for in cryptocurrency and performed on the "blockchain"
  - Signed for by the customer's cryptocurrency wallet bolted onto the browser



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## So How Good Is The Ethereum Blockchain As A Computer

- Global Limit: 2 million "gas" per second
  - Any computation takes some "gas" as measured in the Ethereum Virtual Machine
- Simplest computation: 256b addition = 3 gas
- Ethereum Blockchain:
  - 600,000 additions per second
  - Cost to use? \$250 a second!
- Raspberry Pi 4:
  - 3,000,000,000 additions per second
  - Cost to use? \$45 to buy forever!

#### So The Space is Dismal

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- The value is nonexistent
- The harms are great
- So avoid it...
- Or work on making it die in a fire



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## Case Study: Facebook Messenger Abuse Protocol



#### **Content Warning**

- The following is discussing Facebook's Messenger's abuse protocol
- Abusive behavior in messengers is dominated by gendered abuse
- This is a very useful protocol to understand:
  - It tackles real world issues and is a very nice example of applied cryptography



#### Facebook Messenger: Background

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- Facebook Messenger now has an encrypted chat option
  - Limited to their phone app
  - The cryptography in general is very good
  - Uses a well-regarded asynchronous messenger library (from Signal) with good security properties



### Facebook's Unique Messenger Problem: Abuse

- Much of Facebook's biggest problem is dealing with abuse...
  - What if either Alice or Bob is a stalker, an a-hole, or otherwise problematic?
    - Aside: A huge amount of abuse is explicitly gender based, so I'm going to use "Alex" as the abuser and "Bailey" as the victim through the rest of this example
- Facebook would expect the other side to complain
  - And then perhaps Facebook would kick off the perpetrator for violating Facebook's Terms of Service
- But fake abuse complaints are also a problem
  - So can't just take them on face value
- And abusers might also want to release info publicly
  - Want sender to be able to *deny to the public* but not to Facebook
  - Deniability is in many ways anti-authentication: Want to make it so you don't have public key signatures




#### Facebook's Problem Quantified

- Unless Bailey forwards the unencrypted message to Facebook
  - Facebook *must not* be able to see the contents of the message
- If Bailey does forward the unencrypted message to Facebook
  - Facebook *must ensure* that the message is what Alex sent to Bailey
- Nobody *but* Facebook should be able to verify this: No public signatures!
  - Critical to prevent abusive release of messages to the public being verifiable: Messages are *deniable* for everybody but Facebook



#### The Protocol In Action





#### The Protocol In Action





```
{message=E(K<sub>pub_b</sub>,
 M={"Hey Bailey: Abusive
        Message",
        k<sub>rand</sub>}),
 mac=HMAC(k<sub>rand</sub>, M),
 to=Bailey}
```



```
{message=E(Kpub_b,
M={"Hey Bailey: Abusive
Message",
krand}),
mac=HMAC(krand, M),
to=Bailey,
from=Alex,
time=now,
fbmac=HMAC(Kfb,{mac, from,
to, time})}
```





#### Some Notes

- Facebook can not read the message or even verify Alex's HMAC
  - As the key for the HMAC is in the message itself
- Only Facebook knows their HMAC key
  - And its the only information Facebook *needs* to retain in this protocol: Everything else can be discarded
- Bailey upon receipt checks that Alex's HMAC is correct
  - Otherwise Bailey's messenger silently rejects the message
    - Forces Alex's messenger to be honest about the HMAC, even thought Facebook never verified it
- Bailey trusts Facebook when Facebook says the message is from Alex
  - Bailey does *not verify* a signature, because there is no signature to verify...
     But the Signal protocol uses an ephemeral key agreement so that implicitly verifies Alex as well



### Now To Report Abuse











#### **Facebook's Verification**

- First verify that Bailey correctly reported the message sent
  - Verify fbmac=HMAC(K<sub>fb</sub>, {mac, from, to, time})
    - Only Facebook can do this verification since they keep K<sub>fb</sub> secret
  - This enables Facebook to confirm that this is the message that it relayed from Alex to Bailey
- Then verify that Bailey didn't tamper with the message
  - Verify mac=HMAC(k<sub>rand</sub>, {M, k<sub>rand</sub>})
- Now Facebook knows this was sent from Alex to Bailey and can act accordingly
  - But Bailey can't prove that Alex sent this message to anyone other than Facebook
  - And Bailey can't tamper with the message because the HMAC is also a hash